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Abstract 
 Reﬂecting on Driessen’s contribution to this volume, the author tries to probe trends in religious 
aﬃliation as described by Driessen, and to raise questions for further research. Th ese religious 
trends are discussed mainly from the perspective of education and the social signiﬁcance of reli-
gion. Th e former is of interest, the author argues, in view of the fact that all respondents are 
young parents of primary school children, while the latter perspective helps to explain the 
increase in the number of Muslims in relation to their socio-economic deprivation. Th e author 
tentatively concludes that these trends in religious aﬃliation probably reﬂect a religious transfor-
mation in the direction of vicarious and ethnic religion. 
 Keywords 
 one-step question, two-step question, religious socialisation, socio-economic position, denomi-
nation, sect, vicarious religion, ethnic religion 
 1 Introduction 
 Driessen’s article is important and interesting in more than one way. Using 
data derived from a multiple cohort study among a representative sample of 
parents of primary school pupils, Driessen identiﬁes trends in religious 
aﬃliation in the Netherlands over a period of ten years. He also compares 
diﬀerent denominations in the Netherlands, as well as Islam, which adds to 
the scientiﬁc importance and novelty of his study. Driessen presents trends 
in religious aﬃliation indicating that, whereas the number of adherents of 
mainstream Christian denominations is gradually decreasing, the number of 
Muslims is growing. What do these trends imply and what do they tell us 
about the current state of the church and religion in a modern society like the 
Netherlands? Unfortunately such questions are not addressed by Driessen, 
who limits himself to describing trends. As a kind of supplement to Driessen’s 
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contribution, therefore, I reﬂect on his ﬁndings from various theoretical per-
spectives in order to come to a better understanding of the trends he describes 
and raise some questions for further research. 
 As a ﬁrst step I compare Driessen’s ﬁgures with the results of similar research 
into religious aﬃliation conducted recently in the Netherlands. Th is aﬀords a 
better perspective on his ﬁndings (section 2). Next I pay attention to the group 
of people from which Driessen’s data derive, namely young parents. Since 
parents play the most crucial role in the religious upbringing of their children, 
the potential church members of tomorrow, it is interesting to consider his 
ﬁndings from an educational perspective (section 3). Next I consider whether 
Driessen’s ﬁndings oﬀer a possible explanation for these trends and tentatively 
refer to some socio-economic factors he discusses (section 4). Finally, on the 
basis of these reﬂections, I interpret these trends in religious aﬃliation in terms 
of the rise of vicarious and ethnic religion (section 5). 
 2 Th e Broader Context: Religious Developments in the Netherlands 
 In light of similar research into the present state of religious aﬀairs in the 
Netherlands, Driessen’s ﬁndings contain no surprises. Th at is to say, the gen-
eral decline in religious aﬃliation that Driessen detects is conﬁrmed by other 
research. For example, the research project God in Nederland (God in the 
Netherlands), which studies trends in religious aﬃliation, religious practices 
and religious beliefs at ten year intervals as from 1966, clearly reveals that 
religious aﬃliation among the Dutch population as a whole has dropped 
over the past four decades. According to the recently published 2006 ﬁgures 
(Bernts et al., 2007, p. 14), the proportion of the Dutch population reporting 
to be members of the Roman Catholic Church dropped from 35% in 1966 to 
16% in 2006 — a decline of over 50%! Membership of Protestant churches 
likewise dropped from 25% of the Dutch population in 1966 to 14% in 
2006. By contrast the categories displaying growth over the same period are 
non-aﬃliated groups, which increased from 33% in 1966 to 61% in 2006, 
and those labelled ‘otherwise aﬃliated’.1 Th e latter grew from 7% in 1966 to 
9% in 2006. Another interesting study is that of Becker and De Hart (2006), 
which focuses more speciﬁcally on developments in smaller Christian com-
munities and Islam. As Driessen’s ﬁndings show, religious aﬃliation is not 
1  In the God in Nederland project the category ‘otherwise aﬃliated’ includes very diverse 
religious groups like small orthodox Christian groups, members of migrant churches, adherents 
of non-Western religions, Muslims and the like. 
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dropping all along the line. Islam, along with the category labelled ‘other 
Christian’, are, so to speak, exceptions to the rule. Th is, too, is conﬁrmed by 
the ﬁndings of Becker and De Hart (2006, pp. 29-37), whose ﬁgures not only 
display an increase in the number of Muslims of more than 1600% (!) between 
1971 and 2005, but increases in the membership of several migrant churches 
and smaller Pentecostal and Evangelical communities as well. 
 Th is brief comparison between Driessen’s ﬁndings and the results of similar 
research reveals overall parallels in the results of diﬀerent studies, especially in 
regard to the various trends detected. Whereas the membership of mainstream 
Christian denominations in the Netherlands is plummeting, that of Islam and 
smaller Christian communities seems to be growing, or at least not dropping. 
But there is an important diﬀerence. On average the percentages of religious 
aﬃliation reported by Driessen are higher than those found in the God in 
Nederland project and the study of Becker and De Hart. To mention but one 
striking example, while the God in Nederland project reports that 61% of the 
Dutch population was non-aﬃliated in 2006, Driessen’s sample of parents of 
primary school pupils contains (only) 35.3% non-aﬃliated men and 32.3% 
non-aﬃliated women (cf. table 1).2 
 Th ese diﬀerences are probably attributable to diﬀerent ways of measuring 
religious aﬃliation. Driessen uses the so-called one-step question (“Of which 
church, religious community or worldview-related group do you consider 
yourself a member?”), while the researchers in the God in Nederland project 
and Becker and De Hart use the two-step question (“Do you belong to a reli-
gious denomination?”, followed by “Which one?”). Th e two-step question is 
known to result in higher rates of non-aﬃliation, since this way of questioning 
tends to push marginal church members into the non-aﬃliated category 
(Becker & De Hart, 2006, p. 38). Consequently, although the trends detected 
by Driessen are in line with those emerging from similar research, the question 
nevertheless arises what aﬃliation actually means in Driessen’s study. Given 
Driessen’s use of the one-step question, it is likely that a substantial part of the 
respondents who deﬁne themselves as Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed or 
re-Reformed comprises nominal or marginal members. And what about reli-
gious communities that display growth? Does this represent growth in nomi-
nal or marginal membership, or are we in fact dealing with core members? 
Questions like these are not answered by the ﬁgures Driessen presents, which 
makes it diﬃcult to compare the diverging trends he describes and assess 
their real signiﬁcance. However, that does not detract from the ﬁnding — an 
2  All tables refer to those presented by Driessen. 
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interesting one in itself — that patterns in religious aﬃliation among a speciﬁc 
group of people (young parents) on average corresponds with those displayed 
by the Dutch population as a whole. 
 3 Religious Aﬃliation of Young Parents: an Educational Perspective 
 Religious institutions are known to recruit new members mostly among the 
children of their existing membership. Th us religious aﬃliation is the result of 
religious upbringing in the home rather than of conversion in later life. In the 
Netherlands at any rate people rarely change their religious aﬃliation. Th ey 
stick to the denomination they were brought up in, or give up their religious 
aﬃliation altogether (Becker & De Hart, 2006, p. 40). Th is is the general rule, 
which of course does not mean that people who received a religious upbring-
ing at home never apostasise, nor that proselytisation always fails (Hunsberger, 
2000). Anyway, a religious upbringing is crucial for aﬃliation to a religious 
community. Th is makes Driessen’s ﬁndings all the more interesting from an 
educational perspective, since his data derive from the most inﬂuential educa-
tors one can think of: parents! 
 As mentioned already, a religious upbringing at home is a major determi-
nant of religious commitment in later life. More speciﬁcally, research has 
shown that there are three important conditions for a child to follow in its 
parents’ religious footsteps. Firstly, parents must be genuinely committed to a 
religious tradition and must display their commitment openly to their chil-
dren. Secondly, parents need to be actively involved in a church or religious 
community. And ﬁnally, parents need to engage in regular prayer and Bible (or 
other scriptural) reading in their homes (cf. e.g. Andree 1983; De Hart, 1990, 
p. 179; Spilka et al., 2003, pp. 110-113). Th ese are key activities that parents 
must engage in if they want to transmit their religious commitment to their 
children. 
 In this respect parents are important religious role models for their children. 
Considered from this educational perspective, then, an obvious conclusion 
would be that by and large Islam oﬀers more favourable conditions for trans-
mission to the next generation than Christianity, hence the trends detected by 
Driessen are likely to continue in the foreseeable future. For one things, 
whereas the number of parents who report aﬃliation to a mainline Christian 
denomination (Catholic, Dutch Reformed and re-Reformed) has steadily 
decreased between 1995 and 2005, the number of Muslim parents increased 
by more than 5% (cf. table 1). Th ese ﬁndings indicate that a declining number 
of Dutch parents is able, perhaps even willing, to function as Christian role 
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models for their children, while the number of potential Muslim role models 
is growing. Another noteworthy ﬁnding, according to Driessen’s ﬁgures (cf. 
table 2), is that both Muslims and ‘other’ Christians exhibit a high degree of 
religiously homogeneous marriages, while the marriages of re-Reformed, 
Dutch Reformed and especially Catholic Christians are far more religiously 
mixed. It is known that a religiously homogeneous home constitutes a more 
favourable condition for children’s religious socialisation than a mixed mar-
riage (Hutsebaut, 1995, p.126). Th is is conﬁrmed by research among Dutch 
Muslims conducted by Phalet and Haker (2004, pp. 11-12), which revealed 
that with a view to their children’s religious upbringing Muslims consider it 
important to marry a partner from the same religious background. 
 From an educational perspective the conclusion thus seems to impose itself 
that mainstream Christian churches oﬀer far less favourable conditions for 
maintaining their current position than the Muslim minority, and perhaps the 
smaller Christian communities as well. One has to be very careful, however, in 
making such inferences. To begin with, although an increasing number of 
parents identify themselves as ‘Muslim’ or what Driessen calls ‘other Chris-
tian’, that does not automatically imply that these parents perform the afore-
mentioned educational practices. As explained at the end of section 2, the 
growing identiﬁcation with Islam and ‘other’ Christian communities may 
simply be nominal or marginal, in which case it seems unlikely that these 
parents will take great pains about their children’s religious upbringing. Hence 
until we know more about these parents’ actual educational practices we 
should refrain from drawing conclusions. 
 But even if we did know that Muslim or otherwise aﬃliated parents actually 
function as religious role models in the way described above, that still would 
not tell us much about their children’s future religious commitment. In a crit-
ical review of several Dutch studies into religious socialisation conducted in 
the 1980s Janssen (1988) pointed out a basic ﬂaw. In most studies, according 
to Janssen, appropriate parenting practices with a view to children’s religious 
socialisation were identiﬁed mainly by looking at successful instances of reli-
gious socialisation. Th is not only led to the identiﬁcation of the aforemen-
tioned educational practices, but also created the false impression that they are 
both necessary and suﬃcient for children’s religious socialisation. But as Jans-
sen observes, the impression is not true, because there are a lot of children who 
enjoyed a religious upbringing at home and whose parents served as perfect 
religious role models, but who did not follow in their parents’ religious foot-
steps in later life. Hence providing a religious role model may be necessary for 
transmitting one’s religious commitment to one’s children, but it is not 
suﬃcient! As Jansen points out, this emerges from a comparison of successful 
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and failed instances of religious socialisation of children with the same reli-
gious background. 
 Janssen’s criticism boils down to a rejection of a simplistic model of reli-
gious socialisation, in which religious socialisation is seen as parents transmit-
ting their religious commitment to their children in a one-way process. More 
recent studies of religious socialisation, while emphasising the crucial role of 
parents, also stress the importance of a supportive, authoritative style of par-
enting (cf. e.g. Vergouwen, 2001, pp. 331-332). According to Phalet and 
Haker (2004, pp. 53-55), it is exactly this style of parenting that is rarely 
adopted by religiously committed Muslims, who, on the contrary, tend to 
adopt a more authoritarian style. Th is insight, too, should stop us from jump-
ing to the tempting conclusion that opportunities for transmitting Islam to 
the younger generations are increasing, while those for transmitting main-
stream Christianity are decreasing. 
 Because the trends Driessen describes are based on data derived from young 
parents of primary school pupils, it is interesting to consider his ﬁndings from 
an educational perspective and to see whether they are likely to continue in 
the foreseeable future. As I tried to show above, the mere fact that an increas-
ing number of parents identify with Islam and some smaller Christian com-
munities is in itself insuﬃcient evidence to claim that these groups will be 
more successful in recruiting future members than the mainstream Christian 
denominations. Driessen’s data simply tell us too little about the actual educa-
tional practices of these parents, their parenting styles and the like to make 
such inferences. To enhance the predictive power of a multiple cohort study 
like Driessen’s it is necessary, therefore, to inquire into these aspects. Th at, I 
believe, is what this educational reﬂection on Driessen’s ﬁndings teaches us. 
 4 A Possible Explanation: the Social Signiﬁcance of Religion 
 Predicting future trends in religious aﬃliation is very diﬃcult and requires 
much more information than is oﬀered by Driessen’s study. It is equally 
diﬃcult to explain the trends he describes. Still, for a proper understanding of 
these trends one has to look for explanations. Th us the question considered in 
this section is as follows: what factors cause the membership of the main-
stream Christian churches to decrease and that of Islam and smaller Christian 
communities to increase? Of course, I realise that complex, multifaceted phe-
nomena like the ones we are dealing with here cannot be attributed to just one 
cause. What follows, therefore, is only a preliminary and tentative explanation 
of the growth of Islam and the smaller Christian communities. Partly on the 
basis of Driessen’s ﬁndings, this tentative explanation rests on the following 
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thesis. Th e membership of Islam and smaller Christian communities will 
increase, or at least will not decrease, inasmuch as these religious communities 
are of social signiﬁcance to their members. Let me start by explaining this thesis 
with reference to the growth of the Muslim community in the Netherlands. 
 In his contribution Driessen not only describes trends in religious aﬃliation, 
but also studies the relationship between religious aﬃliation and ethnicity. In 
this respect his ﬁndings conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings reported by Phalet (2004) 
and Phalet and Haker (2004) that the positive relationship between ethnicity 
and religious aﬃliation is strengthened to the extent that the educational level 
of religious minority groups (Turkish and Moroccan Muslims) is relatively 
low and unemployment levels are relatively high (cf. tables 4 and 6 respec-
tively). In this regard one could say that for Turkish and Moroccan Muslims 
the relationship between religious aﬃliation and ethnicity largely boils down 
to a relationship between religious aﬃliation and socio-economic status, as 
level of education and rate of unemployment are usually considered indica-
tors of socio-economic status. 
 What lies behind this association between low socio-economic status and 
stronger religious aﬃliation among Muslims? Having a higher educational 
level, and consequently less unemployment and/or a higher profession, usu-
ally takes Muslims in the Netherlands out of their socio-religious environ-
ment. It enables them to participate more fully in Dutch society and to look 
beyond their own religious group, with the result that participation in, and 
perhaps identiﬁcation, with their own religion may eventually weaken. In the 
case of the Muslim community, then, my argument is that because of 
their socially deprived position a substantial part of the Muslims living in the 
Netherlands continue to exist as a homogeneous group, whose members only 
slowly adjust to the dominant Dutch culture and thus remain more oriented 
to their in-group than to outsiders. It is also a group for which Islam continues 
to serve as an important marker of ethnic identity, so that the social expecta-
tion of being a Muslim, marrying a Muslim partner, raising children reli-
giously and adhering to traditional family values remains intact. Th e social 
signiﬁcance of Islam thus is that it gives Muslims a clear identity in a strange, 
sometimes hostile cultural environment. Th at is how I interpret the ﬁgures 
Driessen presents regarding the association between level of education, unem-
ployment rate and aﬃliation to Islam.3 
3  Especially in regard to Muslims my argument thus emphasises a more or less indirect eﬀect 
of education on religious aﬃliation. Higher levels of education take Muslims out of their socio-
religious environment, which in turn may weaken their identiﬁcation with the Muslim com-
munity and with Islam as such. Of course, this is not to deny possible direct secularising eﬀects
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 Following this line of argument one could also say that to some extent Islam 
in the Netherlands still represents a church form of religion. As a religious 
institution, if Islam can be regarded as such, it encompasses the vast majority 
of Turks and Moroccans (cf. table 3); it contributes to the social integration of 
these ethnic groups as an identity marker; and it provides a well-deﬁned and 
consistent set of family values with a conservative outlook on life (Phalet & 
Haker, 2004, pp.53-55). Th ese features characterise a church form of religion 
rather than a denominational, sectarian or cultic form of religion, to use the 
well-known Troeltsch-Weberian typology of religious organisations (cf. e.g. 
Van der Ven, 1993, pp. 23-24; Bruce, 2002, pp. 76-79). In contemporary 
Dutch society Islam thus seems to occupy the position that the Roman Catho-
lic Church and the major Protestant churches occupied some forty years ago. 
 As far as the smaller Christian communities are concerned, it is far more 
diﬃcult to account for the growth of their membership. To begin with, it 
remains unclear what the category ‘other Christian’ in Driessen’s study really 
means. On the basis of the foregoing comparison between Driessen’s study 
and that of Becker and De Hart (section 2), I assume that this category com-
prises mainly members of Pentecostal and Evangelical communities, since 
they are the ones who displayed the strongest growth over the past ﬁfteen years 
(Becker & De Hart, 2006, pp. 30-31). But we cannot be sure that this is actu-
ally the case. In addition, in regard to educational level and unemployment 
rate these ‘other Christians’ socio-economic position cannot be called poor. In 
this respect they hardly diﬀer from members of mainstream Christian churches 
in the Netherlands. Consequently the growth of these smaller Christian com-
munities cannot be attributed to their members’ poor socio-economic condi-
tions and possible social isolation resulting from that. Th us we have to look for 
an alternative explanation. 
 One alternative explanation could be that the members of smaller Chris-
tian communities themselves may choose to keep aloof from the dominant 
Dutch culture: they are not forced into this position as is the case with a 
large part of the Muslim community, but actively strive for a kind of religious 
of education. As secularisation theorists often point out (cf. Bruce, 2002, pp. 106-117 for a 
critical discussion), higher education in particular makes it more problematic for people to go to 
church and accept metaphysical beliefs or to understand symbols referring to a transcendent 
reality. Th is negative association between higher education and religious belief is conﬁrmed 
by the aforementioned God in Nederland project (Bernts, et al., 2006). In some instances, how-
ever, the empirical ﬁndings reveal no such association. It is quite remarkable, for example, that 
of all the parents included in Driessen’s sample those aﬃliated to the re-Reformed Church appear 
to be the most highly educated (cf. table 3). 
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‘self-segregation’. In terms of the aforementioned typology of religious 
organisations this would make these communities more like sects. Sects are 
small, religious communities of chosen or elected members, who identify 
completely with the religious group and rather uncritically accept its reli-
gious truth claims. In addition sects are marked by a degree of ‘ethical radi-
calism’ that puts their members in opposition to various widely accepted 
values and norms in their socio-cultural environment (Van der Ven, 1993, 
p. 24). In their partial opposition to mainstream culture,4 sects thus display 
traits of what Kelley (1972, p. 84) calls a ‘strong’ religion in contrast to 
the ‘weak’ religion of denominations.5 Consequently sects, because of their 
strong cohesion, high levels of commitment, puriﬁed belief, clear-cut values 
and norms and accompanying lifestyles, also have great social signiﬁcance 
for their members. And although these aspects make sects attractive to 
certain people, the extent of their membership is by nature limited, since 
unlimited growth would turn a sect into just another denomination (Bruce, 
2002, pp. 22-25). 
 Admittedly this account of the upward trend displayed by the category 
‘other Christian’ is highly speculative. It is only supposed to show that, like the 
growth of Islam, the growth of this category may also be explained in terms of 
the social signiﬁcance religion may have for its adherents. As my interpreta-
tion of Driessen’s ﬁndings indicates, the social position of Muslims in Dutch 
society makes Islam a church form of religion with speciﬁc social functions. It 
acts as a strong identity marker, supports social cohesion among Muslims and 
provides traditional family values. By the same token, if those who identify 
themselves as ‘other Christian’ can justiﬁably be considered members of sec-
tarian religious groups, one could argue that their self-chosen, partial isolation 
from the dominant Dutch culture means that these ‘other Christians’ experi-
ence strong social support from and solidarity with their fellow believers. Th is 
helps them to live the life they choose to live in accordance with their religious 
principles, no matter how strange certain elements of this lifestyle may look to 
non-members. 
4  Although sects keep aloof from the dominant culture, they are never completely alienated 
from their cultural environment. With reference to the growing popularity of Evangelical and 
Pentecostal communities in the United States, Wolfe (2006) shows that these religious commu-
nities conform to core values of American culture like individualism and democracy. Th is is 
evident, for instance, in their emphasis on individual religious experience of faith and their con-
gregational nature. 
5  A ‘weak’ religion, according to Kelley (1972, p. 82) is characterised by relativism (recogni-
tion that nobody has a monopoly on truth), diversity (appreciation of individual diﬀerences) and 
dialogue (active exchange of diﬀering ideas). 
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 5 Conclusion: the Rise of Vicarious and Ethnic Religion 
 To conclude my reﬂections on Driessen’s ﬁndings I give a more general inter-
pretation of the trends in religious aﬃliation that he describes. In line with 
much of the foregoing discussion I will try to show that the most striking 
trends Driessen reports — the declining membership of mainstream Christian 
denominations and the increasing number of Muslims — can be seen as part 
of a religious transformation in the direction of vicarious and ethnic religion 
currently taking place in several West European societies. 
 Crucial to this interpretation is that I would deﬁne the present religious 
situation in the Netherlands as belonging without believing. Th is is an inver-
sion of the dictum ‘believing without belonging’, introduced by Davie (2002, 
p. 5) to describe religious developments in contemporary Europe. With this 
expression Davie makes the point that although adherence to traditional reli-
gious beliefs, ritual participation, religious aﬃliation and the like may well be 
declining, religious belief as such by and large persists. More particularly, de-
institutionalisation of religion implies not so much the end of faith but its 
individualisation. Th at is to say, according to Davie, it results in the emergence 
of personal, heterogeneous and de-traditionalised religious belief. To make her 
case Davie cites the European values study, which indeed shows that in many 
West European countries the extent of religious belief greatly surpasses fre-
quency of church attendance, suggesting that institutional religiosity and per-
sonal belief do not necessarily coincide. But does the expression ‘believing 
without belonging’ also apply to the trends described by Driessen? I tend to 
think not. 
 To begin with, very recently this expression has been partly refuted by the 
God in Nederland project (Bernts, Dekker & De Hart, 2007, pp. 39-68; also 
see section 2). Although in 2006 there were still more people who considered 
themselves religious rather than church members, the percentage of the Dutch 
population that calls itself religious has clearly dropped for the ﬁrst time in 
forty years. And if we, like the researchers in the God in Nederland project, 
deﬁne religious belief in terms of belief in God, the association between reli-
gious belief and church membership again appears to be very strong. Of course, 
this is probably due to the use of the two-step question in the God in Nederland 
project. As noted in the second section, the two-step question tends to push 
marginal church members into the non-aﬃliated category, which automatically 
strengthens the association between religious belief and church membership. 
 But if this is true, the association between religious belief and church mem-
bership may be weakened if the one-step question is used, which could be the 
case, I believe, with Driessen’s ﬁndings. Notwithstanding his ﬁnding that the 
membership of mainstream Christian denominations is declining, it is still 
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relatively high, especially in view of the respondents’ fairly youthful average 
age of approximately 36 years. Th is brings us back to a question posed in the 
second section: what does aﬃliation actually mean in Driessen’s study? In my 
view the trends in religious aﬃliation indicate not so much the religious 
involvement of respondents in mainstream Christian denominations, and 
maybe in the Muslim community as well, but rather their ‘cultural’ belonging. 
Because Driessen’s study provides no additional information about the respon-
dents’ religious beliefs and practices, this remains an assumption. But if proven 
correct and trends in religious aﬃliation to some extent reﬂect respondents’ 
‘cultural’ belonging to their religious traditions, Davie’s expression has to be 
inverted and at least part of the religious situation in the Netherlands should 
be described as belonging without believing. 
 But why would such nominal or cultural belonging to a religious tradition 
still be important to people? Th e answer may lie in the phenomena known as 
vicarious and ethnic religion. Th e notion of vicarious religion also features in 
Davie’s work, mainly to explain that a society completely devoid of religion 
cannot actually exist. Drawing largely on the work of Hervieu-Léger (2000), 
she understands religion as a kind of collective memory (tradition), which 
prevents society from disintegrating by depicting an image of a shared past, 
present and future. A collective memory — and that is typical of religion 
(Hervieu-Léger, 2000, pp. 97-100; 124-127) — that transcends history, is 
vested with authority and thus confers a collective identity on the members of 
a community. However, modern people typically do not constantly celebrate 
and actualise this shared identity. Instead it is done on their behalf, that is 
vicariously, by the churches. And according to Davie this has become one of 
the most important functions of churches in Europe, evidenced by the still 
considerable need among European populations for religious ceremonies to 
mark birth, marriage and death, as well as the importance widely attached to 
religious services in times of national crisis or to commemorate the death of 
public ﬁgures (Davie, 2000, pp. 71-81; 2002, p. 19).6 Although people may 
not be actively involved in church life, they may still be convinced that the 
church fulﬁls an important function in making sense of individual and collec-
tive misfortune and strengthening solidarity in times of crisis.7 From this 
6  As striking examples Davie discusses the funerals of former French president François Mit-
terrand, an outspoken advocate of the French principle of the secular society, laïcité, who was 
nevertheless buried according to Catholic rites, and Princess Diana, whose death triggered mas-
sive spontaneous congregations in church buildings all over Britain. 
7  A function which is recognised by the majority of the Dutch population. Th e aforemen-
tioned God in Nederland project not only reveals a decline in religious aﬃliation, but also shows
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perspective I consider the fact that a declining but still substantial number of 
young parents claim to be aﬃliated to one of the mainstream Christian 
denominations to be an instance of vicarious religion. Th at is to say, these 
parents probably still nominally support the churches for the sake of rituals 
enacted on their behalf on special occasions. 
 In similar fashion the increase in the number of Muslims may point to a 
trend towards ethnic religion. Th is means that Muslims use Islam as a means 
of ethnic identiﬁcation to compensate for the loss of collective identity, which 
may be threatened by, for instance, Western society with its emphasis on indi-
vidualism and egalitarianism (Hervieu-Léger, 2000, pp. 157-162). Hence the 
growing identiﬁcation with Islam, one of the trends described by Driessen, 
may actually reﬂect a process of ethno-cultural rather than religious 
identiﬁcation, an idea supported by some of the ﬁndings of Phalet and Haker 
(2004) among Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in the Netherlands. Th eir 
research into the religious identiﬁcation and practices of Turkish and Moroc-
can Muslims between 1998 and 2002 reveals that although ritual participa-
tion is declining among these ethnic groups, especially members of the second 
generation, they continue to identify themselves as Muslim. Th us, Phalet and 
Haker (2004, p. 15) infer, for younger Turks and Moroccans there is a grow-
ing diﬀerence between identifying oneself as Muslim and participating in reli-
gious practices. For these younger Turks and Moroccans Islam functions 
mainly as an identity marker, which broadly accords with my description of 
the religious situation in the Netherlands as belonging without believing. 
 In short, the ﬁnal thesis of my reﬂections is that the trends described 
by Driessen in fact illustrate the rise of vicarious and ethnic religion in the 
Netherlands. I emphasise that this is just a hypothesis that needs to be sup-
ported by further research. As I have already mentioned several times, in many 
ways Driessen’s ﬁndings are just too limited to corroborate such inferences. 
Th at would require a far more diﬀerentiated study than simply inquiring after 
respondents’ religious aﬃliation. Still, Driessen convincingly demonstrates 
that even a limited, modest study of religious trends can already be of great 
value. 
that a substantial part of the Dutch population still considers religion important in view of the 
ritual services it may render (73%) and as a moral beacon (74%) (Bernts, et al., 2006, pp. 85-
89). In addition 78% of the Dutch population is convinced that it would be a bad thing for 
churches to disappear, while 64% feels that in every local community there should be at least one 
place of worship (Bernts, et al., 2006, pp. 105-109). Th ese ﬁgures show that in the Netherlands 
the churches are supported not only by church members, but also by a signiﬁcant number of 
non-members, who apparently still value the services the church may render on certain occasions. 
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